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ABSTRACT
Every ten years in the United States, we redraw our congressional districts that elect the
435 members of the House of Representatives after the decennial census data has been
collected and organized. Politicians around the country have taken to using these map
revisions for their party’s own political gains and have been doing so since the time even
before the United States Constitution was ratified. This process where politicians draw
district lines to favor their own party and expand their political power is called
gerrymandering (Trickey, 2017). The purpose of this mixed method study is to
understand the impact gerrymandering has on democracy in the United States, examining
six states specifically at the federal level. The six states examined for this study are
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Iowa, Arizona, and Washington State. A
qualitative analysis of the literature triangulated with a GIS spatial analysis of the six
states answers whether or not specific locations in the US can be characterized as less
democratic based on their political geography, as well as a discussion of how maps that
are not gerrymandered could be drawn.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Every ten years in the United States, we redraw our congressional districts that
elect the 435 members of the House of Representatives after the decennial census data
has been collected and organized. Politicians around the country have taken to using
these map revisions for their party’s own political gains and have been doing so since the
time the United States Constitution was ratified in 1788 (Trickey, 2017). This process,
where politicians draw district lines to favor their own party and expand their political
power, is called gerrymandering (Trickey, 2017). Gerrymandering and the erosion of our
democracy here in the United States are deeply intertwined because it is a process that
allows politicians to choose their voters as opposed to allowing voters to choose their
politicians. Politicians are able to accomplish this goal by drawing the lines on the map so
that the opposing party will win a small number of seats with a high percentage of the
votes, while their party wins more seats with safe (but not excessive) majorities as
illustrated in Figure 1. Politicians, in some states, are responsible for the process of
drawing congressional lines. For instance, in Pennsylvania, congressional lines are drawn
by the state legislature and are subject to a veto by the governor. What this means is that
if one party controls the state legislature and the governorship, that party is able to draw
maps favorable to them (Daley, 2017). In contrast, some states have already put
independent redistricting commissions in charge of the map making process to avoid this
potential for partisan gerrymandering.
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Figure 1: How Gerrymandering Works
The term “gerrymander” came about in March of 1812 when someone said that
the map that Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts signed into law looked like a
salamander and then drew a picture of the creature as shown in Figure 2 (Trickey, 2017).
Using the data that is collected in the census every ten years as well as voting data,
mapmakers are now able to draw these gerrymandered maps relatively easily using GIS
software. It is said that gerrymandering is the art of packing and cracking
(Stephanopoulos, 2014). What is meant by this is that people who tend to vote a certain
way are either packed together so that they win less districts (as shown when red wins in
in situation 3 in Figure 1), or people who vote a certain way are cracked so that they’re in
two or three districts so as to dilute their votes (as shown when blue wins in situation 2 in
Figure 1) (Stephanopoulos, 2014). It is because of the way that this process of packing
and cracking is done in gerrymandered states, that measures of compactness and
efficiency gap data, as well having a look at who lives in these districts based on race and
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average household income, tend to give credence to the idea that certain states are much
more gerrymandered relative to others.

Figure 2: The Gerrymander
This mixed method study has been done using an integration of correlational
analysis and investigation of specific case study states. The researcher examined six
different states for both the correlational and case study components of this research. The
overarching goal of this work is to be able to provide a more thorough understanding of
gerrymandering from a geographic perspective; as well as discussion points regarding
how we might be able to draw better congressional maps and the best way to quantify
gerrymandering. Regardless which side of the political spectrum that one falls on,
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gerrymandering is a pressing issue because these maps are stripping the United States of
the competitive elections democracy requires in order for congress to actually find
common ground in order to legislate.

Research Problem
The purpose of this mixed method study is to understand the impact
gerrymandering has on democracy in the United States, examining six states specifically
at the federal level. For this research, gerrymandering will be defined as politicians
drawing district lines to favor their own party and expand their power (Trickey, 2017).

Research Questions
1. How can the United States be characterized as less democratic depending on the
geographic location of where one lives?


What do gerrymandered districts look like on a map?


How can one measure how representative those elected are of their
electorate?

2. How can maps that are less gerrymandered, or not gerrymandered at all be drawn?


What would manageable standards include, exclude, and take into
consideration for measuring whether a political gerrymander burdens the
representational rights of a party’s voters?
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Research Objectives
The following objectives will be met to answer the research questions:


Determine the impact gerrymandering has on individuals’ vote who live in these
gerrymandered districts and the political process as a whole after examining the
case study literature



Identify the most precise tool to measure gerrymandered congressional districts
after examining compactness data, measuring clustering of different
demographics using the cluster and outlier analysis (Anselin Local Morans I) tool
in ArcGIS, and calculating efficiency gaps



Identify ways in which gerrymandered maps can be avoided after examining case
study literature, measuring compactness of each district, and calculating
efficiency gaps



Identify the overall impact that gerrymandering has on democracy, defined as a
government by the people (“Definition of DEMOCRACY,” n.d.), after examining
the case study literature, comparing gerrymandering measures, and comparing the
six case study states
Study Area
The six states that were examined for this study are Pennsylvania, North Carolina,

Wisconsin, Iowa, Arizona, and Washington State as shown in Figure 3. The states of
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Wisconsin were selected because their maps have
been taken to the courts on account of partisan gerrymandering. Iowa, Arizona, and
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Washington State were selected because each of these states takes active measures to try
and avoid gerrymandering at all costs.
Gerrymandering research, while abundant (Daley, 2017; Stephanopoulos, 2014;
Trickey, 2017), hasn’t been approached the way that it is in this work. There has been a
lot of research completed on the history of gerrymandering (Trickey, 2017), how to
measure it (Edwards, Crespin, Williamson, & Palmer, 2017), and what the effects of it
are (Daley, 2017). This work is unique in its aim of identifying where in the United States
is less democratic when it comes to sending members to congress to represent the people.
From this fact, this study is warranted, because in order to have gerrymandering be seen
as the pressing issue that it is by the public, there needs to be work completed and
reputable findings disseminated about the impact that gerrymandering has on the
democratic principles that the United States has forever held dear.

Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Case Study States
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Definitions


Cluster and Outlier Analysis (Anselin Local Morans I)- Tool used in ArcGIS that,
when given a set of weighted features, identifies statistically significant hot spots,
cold spots, and spatial outliers using the Anselin Local Moran’s Statistic (“Cluster
and Outlier Analysis (Anselin Local Moran’s I)—ArcGIS Pro | ArcGIS Desktop,”
n.d.)



Democracy- “A government by the people” (“Definition of DEMOCRACY,” n.d.)



The Efficiency Gap- “Represents the difference between the parties’ respective
wasted votes in an election divided by the total number of votes cast. It captures, in a
single tidy number, all of the packing and cracking decisions that go into a district
plan” (Stephanopoulos, 2014)



Equal Protections Clause- Refers to the United States Constitution Amendment XIV
Clause 1 that states, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Constitution, 1787)



Gerrymandering- Politicians drawing district lines to favor their own party and
expand their power (Trickey, 2017)
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Redistricting- “The process by which the boundaries of elective districts are
periodically redrawn to maintain equal representation on the basis of population”
(Pennsylvania Redistricting, 2011)



REDMAP (Redistricting Majority Project)- A Republican scheme that was created in
early 2010 with the intent of changing the map from blue (Democrat) to red
(Republican) (Daley, 2017)



Spatial Autocorrelation (Global Moran’s I) – The Spatial Autocorrelation (Global
Moran’s I) tool used in ArcGIS measures spatial autocorrelation based on both
feature locations and feature values simultaneously (“How Spatial Autocorrelation
(Global Moran’s I) works—ArcGIS Pro | ArcGIS Desktop,” n.d.)



Voting Rights Act of 1965- Enacted to ensure minorities that their right to vote, as
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment, would not be abridged by State and local
governments through the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other discriminatory
electoral devices (Research Division N.C. General Assembly, 2011)
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
“The spatial perspective of geographers seemingly offers a
common ground with political science and why the
messiness of a world of regions that is constantly in the
process of being reshaped and redefined by internal and
external forces lacks appeal to a law-seeking discipline.” –
John O’Loughlin (O’Loughlin, 2000)
This literature review aims to provide context to understand the history of
gerrymandering, why it is a pressing issue, the effects it has on the political process, and
methods for measuring gerrymandered districts before looking at each of the six case
study states. Understanding the history of gerrymandering and why it is a pressing issue
is important with the 2020 census approaching, Americans should be aware of what kinds
of things politicians can make happen using this data and a map. The case study states
have been broken up into two groups in this literature review; ‘Gerrymandered States’
and ‘States That Seek To Avoid Gerrymandering’. This distinction is intended to reiterate
the differences in the two case study groups. The maps in Figures 4-9 were drawn
following the 2010 Census. This is important to note as some of the districts have been
redrawn by courts in 2017 and earlier in 2018. The reason that the maps within this study
have not been updated is for consistency. After the election and census in 2010, all of the
maps in this report were the maps that were constructed.
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Gerrymandering: History and Salience
Gerrymandering, in this study, is defined as politicians drawing district lines to
favor their own party and expand their power (Trickey, 2017). Before the word
“gerrymander” came to be and even before the United States Constitution took effect,
redistricting was already being used for political gain (Barasch, 2012). The term
“gerrymander” came into existence when illustrator Elkanah Tisdale drew a picture map
of the Massachusetts voting districts as if it were a monster with claws and a snake-like
head on its neck as shown in Figure 2. Another guest at the Boston dinner party they were
attending noted that it looked like a salamander. Richard Alsop, who often collaborated
with Tisdale, said “No, a Gerry-mander”, which was in reference to Elbridge Gerry, the
governor who had signed the bill creating the misshapen Massachusetts districts (Trickey,
2017). Elbridge Gerry was a Founding Father, a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, framer of the Constitution, congressman, diplomat, and fifth vice president
of the United States. Democratic-Republicans who controlled the state’s legislature,
redrew the state’s Senate districts to benefit their party. Until then, senatorial districts had
followed county boundaries (Trickey, 2017). The new senate map that DemocraticRepublicans had drawn was filled with unnatural shapes and this map was signed into
law by Elbridge Gerry in February of 1812. Tisdale’s drawing appeared in the Boston
Gazette on March 26, 1812 with the headline, “The Gerry-mander” (Trickey, 2017).
After the 1840 census, the Apportionment Act of 1842 made it so that
congressional districts had to be contiguous and compact. Before this act in 1842, many
states elected their members of the House of Representatives at large, which allowed for
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the majority party in a state to elect all of its congressmen. This bill made it so that every
state had to be split into congressional districts based on the number of representatives
they were allotted after the census, and that a single representative be elected from each
district (Barasch, 2012). After the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, some states,
such as North Carolina created “majority-minority” districts in which the majority of the
constituents in the district are non-white, based on census data (Daley, 2017). This was
done with the intention that it would remedy historic discrimination and help to promote
the election of minority politicians (Barasch, 2012). Although this strategy may have
been successful in its goals, it also diluted the minority vote as most people of color were
packed into these racially gerrymandered districts.
The United States Constitution only mentions redistricting a few times, which has
left a lot of room for debate about what is constitutional and what might be
unconstitutional. What the United States Constitution explicitly states about electing
members to the House of Representatives or actions closely related is as follows (U.S.
Constitution, 1787):


Article I, Section 2, Clause 1: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the
electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislature”



Amendment XIV, Clause 1: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
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privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”


Amendment XIV, Clause 2: “Representatives shall be appointed among the several
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each state, excluding Indians not taxed…”

With all of this room for debate, it has meant that several cases have been brought before
the United States Supreme Court. The most important ones in terms of this study are as
follows (McGann, Smith, Latner, & Keena, 2016):


Reynolds v. Sims (1964)- The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires as close to
equal population sizes in each congressional district as possible



Davis v. Bandemer (1986)- The U.S. Supreme Court said that partisan gerrymanders
are allowable unless they “consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’
influence on the political process as a whole”



Shaw v. Hunt (1996)- The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated when race is the predominant consideration in drawing district lines
and the legislature subordinates “traditional districting principles” to race in order to
create minority districts without a compelling state interest
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Hunt v. Cromartie (1999)- The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the argument that a
redrawn district in North Carolina was drawn for political, not racial, reasons and thus
was potentially not unconstitutional



Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004)- The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the political
gerrymandering claim raised in that case and found no existing manageable rules for
measuring whether a political gerrymander burdens the representational rights of a
party’s voters



League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)- The U.S. Supreme Court
considered a political gerrymander claim and held that a state legislature’s middecade redrawing of a plan drawn by a federal court did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause as a partisan gerrymander, even if the legislature’s primary purpose
was the advancement of their own party
Time and time again the United States Supreme Court has heard cases regarding

redistricting biases. The cases listed above are the most relevant to this study because
they lay out the majority of rules that have been developed for the process of
redistricting. These Supreme Court cases also show that there simply is no pleasing
everyone when it comes time for redistricting. Overall, it is more accurate to describe the
Supreme Court’s actions in regards to gerrymandering as signaling that districts should
be drawn so that all votes count equally and so that no one’s voting rights are violated.
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Effects of Gerrymandering
When it comes to American politics, geography matters. Geography is central to
the operation of almost all electoral systems through the interaction of two map entities,
the distribution of voters (and their political preferences), and the division of natural
space into constituencies. This interaction results in election outcomes that are both
disproportional and biased with the allocation of seats being unequal to the distribution of
votes across parties (Johnston, 2002). Partisan gerrymandering has major consequences
not only for who wins elections, but for the political process as a whole. Large efficiency
gaps lead to large changes in the ideology of the median voter in the legislature
(increased polarization, which is Republicans being ideologically farther to the right
while Democrats are ideologically farther to the left, leaving little chance for the two
sides to come to a compromise) and have significant effects on state policy (Caughey,
Tausanovitch, & Warshaw, 2017).
The most detrimental effect that gerrymandering has on the United States as a
whole is the intense polarization that we are witnessing in contemporary politics (Daley,
2017). Those who say that gerrymandering does not cause polarization say that people
who are alike tend to live by each other (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2009). While in
some cases this may be correct, it is an oversimplified answer to a complicated problem.
Gerrymandering definitely causes polarization because it creates safe districts for one
party or the other. The result of this map full of safe districts is that the only thing a
congressperson has to fear is a primary challenger from farther to the right if they’re a
Republican or a primary challenger from further to left if they’re a Democrat. What
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happens when the only competitive election a congressperson might face is in a primary
election? They vote along the party lines constantly and nearly without exception. Aside
from those voting in the House of Representatives, it further polarizes the American
people as well because it’s seen as weakness to work with the other side anymore (Daley,
2017). The reason it’s seen as weakness is because they’re the ones being exposed to the
campaign ads put out during primary season by primary contenders that are saying that
representative such and such doesn’t represent your values because of the way they voted
on x, y, and z bills.

Methods of Understanding and Analyzing Gerrymandering
While it’s relatively simple to pick out your favorite definition of gerrymandering
from the literature and then be able to understand what it means, it’s a lot harder of a
concept to describe scientifically in a way that is admissible in court- this is the issue that
gerrymandering poses. It is important to remember that when it comes to
gerrymandering, there is no guarantee of finding a way to draw districts in an unbiased
fashion. States with larger populations and a large number of congressional districts, the
problem of finding a fair solution to the problem that is redistricting becomes even more
difficult. While some have come up with ways to try and measure how gerrymandered
districts are or talked about how important independent redistricting commissions are,
others have more partisan solutions such as an alternating move game where parties
sequentially choose districts (Puppe & Tasnádi, 2008). Independent Redistricting
Commissions make it so that the people drawing the congressional districts are
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independent of partisan public officials. Relative to legislatures, Independent
Redistricting Commissions tend to draw more compact districts, show more respect for
the boundaries of local governments, and may also do a better job of preserving the
population cores of prior districts (Edwards et al., 2017). It is relatively easy to
understand why state legislators compromise traditional redistricting principles when
they control the redistricting process, partisan gain. In general, redistricting commissions
have less incentive to manipulate district boundaries for partisan gain (Edwards et al.,
2017). The alternating move game is a simple solution to a complex problem, otherwise
known as politics in 2018.
The first way that gerrymandering can be measured quantitatively is by measuring
the compactness of districts. Compactness refers to how compressed congressional
districts are or how spread out that they might be as well. When measuring compactness,
courts have focused on three quantitative measures; Reock scores, Convex Hull ratios,
and Polsby-Popper scores (Edwards et al., 2017). Reock scores and Convex Hull ratios
are two dispersion measures that can be calculated by dividing the area of the district by
the area of the smallest circle that would fully contain the district or the smallest convex
polygon enclosing the district. Polsby-Popper scores are calculated by dividing the area
of a district by the area of a circle with a perimeter equal in length to the perimeter of the
district (Edwards et al., 2017). Each of these measures falls between 0 and 1, higher
values correspond with more compact districts.
The other and, perhaps, the more scientifically accurate way that gerrymandering
can be measured quantitatively is by calculating the efficiency gap for congressional
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districts (Stephanopoulos, 2014). The efficiency gap is the difference between the parties’
respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total number of votes cast. Wasted
votes are ballots that don’t contribute to victory for candidates and they come in two
forms; lost votes cast for candidates who are defeated, and surplus votes cast for winning
candidates but in excess of what was necessary for them to win (Stephanopoulos, 2014).
The efficiency gap tells us exactly how big the difference between the parties’ wasted
votes actually is. In a state that has perfect partisan symmetry, both parties would have
the same number of wasted votes. The efficiency gap does a better job of quantifying a
gerrymander because it shows the packing and cracking that are at the heart of every
gerrymander. Surplus votes for winning candidates are the definition of packing, and lost
votes for defeated candidates the definition of cracking (Stephanopoulos, 2014).

Previous Gerrymandering Research
Being that gerrymandering is an issue older than the United States Constitution
itself, a lot of research exists that focuses on this political strategy (Barasch, 2012). The
research that exists has to do with, but is not limited to how to measure quantitatively a
gerrymander, the effects of gerrymandering, and how gerrymandering can be avoided.
Ways that gerrymandering has been measured in the past has to do with measuring the
compactness of districts and measuring the efficiency gaps of states (Edwards et al.,
2017; Stephanopoulos, 2014). Strategies as far as how to avoid gerrymandering lack
consensus and are truly all over the place. Some have suggested an alternating move
game where parties go back and forth choosing districts as they please (Puppe & Tasnádi,
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2008), while others have designed computer algorithms that prioritize compactness,
ensuring that voters are geographically closer together (Ingraham, 2016).
The most effective way to combat gerrymandering is to include partisan balance
in the rules for how to draw the congressional maps every ten years (Cohn, 2018). What
this would likely do is turn every congressional race every couple of years into a
competitive election. While some argue that gerrymandering does not cause polarization
(McCarty et al., 2009), others argue that large efficiency gaps (or non-competitive
elections) lead to large changes in the ideology of the median member of congress
actually increasing polarization (Caughey et al., 2017). Regardless of which party and
individual affiliates with and which party gerrymandered the state in which that
individual resides, it is imperative to the democratic principles that this country is
beholden to that people and politicians get on board with finding a solution to the
gerrymandering problem.
Case Studies: Gerrymandered States
North Carolina
Gerrymandering in North Carolina has been an issue for quite some time now
(Almasy, 2018). Most recently, on January 9, 2018, federal judges said that North
Carolina will have to redraw its 13 congressional districts as they exist in Figure 4
because the map is so partisan that it is unconstitutional (Almasy, 2018). Then, on August
27, 2018, a panel of three federal judges held that North Carolina’s congressional districts
were unconstitutionally gerrymandered to favor Republicans over Democrats and said it
may require new districts before the November elections, possibly affecting control of the
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house (Barnes, 2018b). A three judge panel rejected the previous map drawn by the
Republican controlled General Assembly, stating that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause, the First Amendment, and Article I of the Constitution. These three judges only
gave the state of North Carolina about three weeks to file a new map with the court so
that it can be in place by the 2018 midterms (Almasy, 2018). This case is significant for
the entire country because it is the first time a federal court has struck down a
congressional map because it represented a partisan gerrymander. Judge James A. Wynn
of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in the majority opinion, “… Partisan
gerrymandering runs contrary to numerous fundamental democratic principles and
individual rights…”. Voters in North Carolina have been nearly split along partisan lines
recently in elections. With this being said however, Republicans control ten U.S. House
seats compared with only three for Democrats (Almasy, 2018).
While redistricting and gerrymandering especially are very important issues in
terms of the legitimacy of our democracy here in the United States, it’s almost impossible
to make something as complicated and confusing as redistricting a winning political
issue. A politician would have a very hard time running a winning campaign with
redistricting being the focus of that campaign. As we have seen time and time again,
campaigns are won on catchy slogans and simple solutions to complex problems here in
the United States. In the 1990s, Republicans in North Carolina partnered with black
Democrats to create new districts that would almost certainly elect a minority candidate
due to the demographic makeup of these new districts (Daley, 2017). While African
Americans did indeed make historic gains in congressional representation, Republicans
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claimed the rest of the seats (besides these few they had created with black Democrats)
for themselves (Daley, 2017). In North Carolina, race has played an explicit role in
gerrymandering and changing the makeup of the state’s congressional delegation.
Because of the gerrymandering happening in North Carolina, a state that leans
Republican but could truly go either way in any given election season, that has only
elected three Republican governors in the last century, which went for Barack Obama in
2008, has a congressional delegation that’s 77% Republican (Daley, 2017).
In North Carolina, even as it sat so obviously gerrymandered for so long, there were
several attempts to make the case that it was indeed an issue. The reason that it was hard
to make this gerrymandering case is because of the rules that the North Carolina
legislature has in place for redistricting. In North Carolina, the General Assembly, at the
first regular session convening after the return of census data that is gathered every ten
years by order of Congress, revises the representative districts and the apportionment of
representatives among the districts (Research Division N.C. General Assembly, 2011).
The politicians in the General Assembly have only their interpretation of the following
requirements to regulate the maps they produce (Research Division N.C. General
Assembly, 2011):


Each Representative shall represent, as nearly as may be, an equal number of
inhabitants, the number of inhabitants that each Representative represents being
determined for this purpose by dividing the population of the district that he
represents by the number of Representatives apportioned to that district



Each representative district shall at all times consist of contiguous territory
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No county shall be divided in the formation of a representative district



After the districts and apportionment of representatives are established, they shall
remain unaltered until the return of new census data taken by order of Congress

Figure 4: North Carolina Congressional Districts

Pennsylvania
When it’s time for redistricting in Pennsylvania, congressional lines are drawn by
the state legislature and are ultimately only subject to a veto by the governor. In 2010,
just before the census data was returned to the legislators for redistricting, the Republican
Party won the majority of the state legislature including the governorship (Daley, 2017).
As Pennsylvania legislators have shown, when you craft the lines just right on the map,
you control every last detail of a state’s politics. They had created districts where the
Democrats win a small number of seats with a high percentage of the votes, and where
the Republicans win more seats with safe but not excessive margins (Daley, 2017). The
perfect gerrymander as illustrated in Figure 5 (Daley, 2017). The Republican Party was
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able to carve itself a lasting domination of the congressional delegation, despite
Pennsylvania’s longtime status as a blue state. In 2012, Obama won 52% of the vote but
Democratic House candidates only won 28% of the seats (Daley, 2017).
While state level legislative redistricting in Pennsylvania is handled by a
Legislative Reapportionment Commission, the boundaries of congressional seats in
Pennsylvania are redrawn after every federal decennial (which is every ten years) census
by legislative action. How this process works is by a bill proceeding through both
chambers of their General Assembly and is then signed into law by the governor
(Pennsylvania Redistricting, 2011). It is easy to see how partisan maps come to be when
the process is set up like this and one party is in control of both the general assembly and
the governorship as was the case in Pennsylvania in 2010.
Pennsylvania’s gerrymandered congressional map was brought before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and they decided that a new congressional map must be
made. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court released that map earlier this year in 2018
(Cohn, 2018). In Pennsylvania, a decision to pursue partisan balance when redistricting
would be particularly helpful for the Democrats because they have a significant number
of votes wasted in both districts that each contain Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. The new
Pennsylvania map released by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court meets every nonpartisan
criteria that seems to be standard elsewhere. It’s compact, minimizes county or municipal
splits and preserves communities of interest (Cohn, 2018). On top of meeting these
nonpartisan criteria, it seems as though the mapmakers consistently made subtle choices
that suggest that partisan balance may have been an important consideration. The court’s
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order did not specify that partisan balance was an objective for this new map. The new
map is closer to fair if it’s judged based on the relationship between seats won and the
statewide popular vote (Cohn, 2018).

Figure 5: Pennsylvania Congressional Districts

Wisconsin
Gerrymandering in Wisconsin is a process that is only governed by courts and
procedural precedents. These precedents dictate that the resulting plan must have districts
equal in population and be enacted into law following the same process as any bill. There
are no statutory or constitutional guidelines in Wisconsin law for congressional
redistricting (Keane, 2016). In 2010, the current gerrymandered map shown in Figure 6
was constructed after the Republicans gained control of the state’s government (Liptak,
2017). In Wisconsin, there have been several reform proposals recently, while the
Republicans were still in control, to make changes to this map- all of them failed to pass.
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These reform proposals included things such as establishing competitiveness criteria for
redistricting plans, excluding incarcerated felons disenfranchised by law from the official
census count for redistricting purposes, and requiring the legislature to create an
independent redistricting commission. All of these reform proposals would have had to
have been amendments made to the state of Wisconsin’s constitution (Keane, 2016).
While the Supreme Court has struck down voting districts as racial gerrymanders,
it has never struck down a legislative map because of partisan gerrymandering. This year
(2018) however, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a decision striking down the
legislative map for the Wisconsin State Assembly drawn by Republicans (after the
Republican Party gained control of the state’s government for the first time in more than
40 years in 2010). The decision made by the federal court that is to be appealed in the
Supreme Court is the first in more than 30 years to reject a voting map as an
unconstitutional, partisan gerrymander (Liptak, 2017). The Supreme Court was not
persuaded by the challengers that they had presented a way for courts to determine when
partisan efforts so infect a state’s political maps that they violate the constitution (Barnes,
2018a) The map they drew, Judge Kenneth F. Ripple wrote on behalf of the majority of a
divided three judge Federal District Court, “was designed to make it more difficult for
Democrats, compared to Republicans, to translate their votes into seats” (Liptak, 2017).
The Republicans responded to this ruling saying essentially that if Democrats lack
electoral power, it is because of geography rather than gerrymandering because
Democrats are often concentrated in cities, effectively diluting their voting power, while
Republicans are more evenly distributed across most states (Liptak, 2017).
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The argument that will be made to the Supreme Court will use the efficiency gap
to make the case for the maps being overturned and redrawn. The efficiency gap in
Wisconsin was 13.3% in 2012 and 9.6% in 2014. The Wisconsin voters who sued to
challenge the Assembly map argued that gaps over 7% violated the constitution. That
number was meant to capture the likelihood that the gap would endure over a 10 year
election cycle (Liptak, 2017).
As mentioned previously, Republicans took complete control of state government
in 2010, just in time to oversee the redistricting process essentially. The first time that
their map was put to the test in 2012, it showed just how effective their partisan
gerrymander was going to be. In 2012, Wisconsin voters would cast 174,000 more votes
for assembly Democrats than assembly Republicans, yet Republicans won 60% of the
seats. Republicans had only managed to get 49% of the aggregate vote in the eight
congressional elections, but still won five of the eight seats. At the state legislative level,
Republicans won 56 of 76 contested assembly races (74% of the seats) with just 52% of
the vote. In state senate races, Republicans brought home six of eleven contested seats
(flipping two Democratic districts in the process), despite Democrats earning 51% of the
votes (Daley, 2017). In order to achieve a gerrymander that would have this type of
results was done very strategically. Wisconsin Republicans wanted to pack as many
Hispanic voters as they could into Milwaukee districts as possible, which would bleach
the surrounding districts whiter and more Republican (Daley, 2017). Wisconsin is an
excellent place to look for an example of the impact gerrymandering has on American
democracy.
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Figure 6: Wisconsin Congressional Districts

Case Studies: States That Seek To Avoid Gerrymandering
Arizona
Arizona is a state that has recognized the problem that gerrymandering poses to
democracy and voters there have taken steps to take politics out of the map drawing
process. In the year 2000, Proposition 106 was a referendum put on the ballet by the
voters in Arizona and it passed with 56% of the vote. Proposition 106 took control of the
redistricting process from partisans and established a citizen panel to redraw lines,
beginning after that year’s census (Daley, 2017). After each census, a new independent
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redistricting commission is assembled to redraw Arizona’s congressional and legislative
districts. The state constitution requires the commissioners, two Republicans, two
Democrats, and an independent chairperson, to start on a fresh map rather than redraw the
existing districts. The concept of one person, one vote dictates that districts should be
roughly equal in population. Other factors that the independent redistricting commission
considers are the federal Voting Rights Act, district shape, geographical features, respect
for communities of interest and potential competitiveness (Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, 2011).
The first independent commission in 2001 proved successful in crafting
congressional districts that shifted sides in swing years. Republicans held a 5-1 advantage
after 2000, which grew to 6-2 after the 2002 elections, then evened to 4-4 amid
Democratic gains in 2006. Democrats took a 5-3 majority after the Obama win in 2008,
and the Republicans reversed that in their 2010 wave election (Daley, 2017). So far, after
the 2012 redistricting process, the same holds true for the current map shown in Figure 7
as well. While these maps might get the job done that they were created to do, that
doesn’t mean they come without controversy. The maps have been challenged by the
state’s Republican majority in the legislature and by Arizona’s conservative governor Jan
Brewer (Daley, 2017). Each time that the map has been challenged in court since the
process has been handed to an independent redistricting commission by partisans, it has
not had to be redrawn for any reason.
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Figure 7: Arizona Congressional Districts

Iowa
Iowa is a state that takes great pride in their redistricting process by aiming to
keep politics out of the process entirely. The redistricting process in Iowa is filled with
trust and no one dares to even challenge the integrity of the lines (Daley, 2017). Since the
year 2000, Iowa has had more competitive congressional races than Texas, California,
and Florida combined, despite having a fraction of the number of seats. Iowa only had
five congressmen throughout the 2000s, then lost one of those seats in the 2010
reapportionment as shown on the map in Figure 8. There is only one district in Iowa that
has been automatic for either party since 2000, with Republicans owning the rural south
western corner of the state, where representative Steve King and the Tea Party have
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established a heartland base. Over the last four decades, Democrats have controlled both
the governor’s office and the legislature for four years while Republicans have had it all
for only two years (Daley, 2017).
Typically, partisan balance is not usually a goal when drawing a new map (Cohn,
2018). Instead, a good map usually means that it is partisan blind, meaning that it strives
for compact districts that respect communities of interest with little or no regard for
partisan outcome. The best example of a partisan blind map is Iowa’s congressional map
shown in Figure 8. The districts are all perfectly compact, according to their rules,
counties cannot be split, and at no point in time when the map is being drawn does
anyone even attempt to do anything partisan (Daley, 2017; Dickinson & Cook, 2011).
After the census, a redistricting commission puts together a plan to be sent to
legislators to approve and sign into law. The standards for redistricting in Iowa include
(Dickinson & Cook, 2011):


Districts shall be established on the basis of population. The districts shall each have
a population as nearly equal as practicable to the ideal population. A Congressional
district shall not vary from the ideal population by more than 1 percent. Districts shall
not vary in population from the ideal population for a State Senatorial or State
Representative district by an average of more than 1 percent. A Senate or House
district shall not have a population which exceeds that of any other Senate or House
district by more than 5 percent. The burden of proof rests with the General Assembly
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to justify the selection of any district in a plan which deviates from the ideal
population for that district by more than 1 percent.


Within the population variance limitations of the first standard, and to the extent
possible, the number of counties and cities divided among more than one district shall
be as small as possible. When there is a choice between dividing local political
subdivisions, the more populous subdivisions shall be divided before the less
populous, except when a county line divides a city.



Districts shall be composed of convenient contiguous territory



Districts shall be reasonably compact in form, to the extent consistent with the first
three standards. In general, reasonably compact districts are those which are square,
rectangular, or hexagonal in shape, and not irregularly shaped, to the extent permitted
2 by natural or political boundaries. Methods for determining compactness are
provided by law and include a length-width compactness test and a perimeter
compactness test.



A district shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent
legislator or member of Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of
augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial minority group. In
establishing districts, no use shall be made of any of the following data:


a. Addresses of incumbent legislators or members of Congress.



b. Political affiliations of registered voters.



c. Previous election results.
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d. Demographic information, other than population head counts, except as
required by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.



Each Representative district shall be wholly included within a single Senatorial
district and, so far as possible, each Representative and each Senatorial district shall
be included within a single Congressional district. However, the standards described
above shall take precedence where a conflict arises between those standards and the
requirement, so far as possible, of including a Senatorial or Representative district
within a single Congressional district.



The new districting plan shall not be used prior to the primary election of 2012. If a
vacancy in a district occurs at a time where a special election is required to fill a term
prior to January 2013, the present Congressional, Senatorial, and House district plans
as described in the 2011 Iowa Code shall be used.



Each bill embodying a plan shall include provisions for election of senators to the
general assemblies which take office in 2013 and 2015, which shall be in conformity
with Article Ill, section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Iowa.
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Figure 8: Iowa Congressional Districts
Washington
Every ten years, the bipartisan Washington State Redistricting Commission is put
together for the purpose of redrawing legislative and congressional district boundaries.
Four commissioners are appointed by the legislature (a house Democrat, house
Republican, senate Democrat and senate Republican). A fifth, non-voting, non-partisan
chairperson, is then appointed by the commissioners (Redistricting, 2011). In spring of
2011, Washington received its 2010 census data for redrawing legislative and
congressional district boundaries. All of the redistricting data were then used by the
Washington State Redistricting Commission to redraw the boundaries for each of the
state’s 49 legislative and now ten congressional districts as shown below in Figure 9.
After redistricting was complete in 2012, the commission was disbanded and will be put
back together with different members in 2021, following the 2020 census.
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The Washington State constitution says that when redistricting, districts should be
contiguous, compact, and convenient, while following natural geographic, artificial, or
political subdivision boundaries. The commission is also not allowed to purposely draw
plans to favor or discriminate against any political party or group. By statute, Washington
further provides that districts should be drawn to preserve areas recognized as
communities of interest, and that the number of divided counties and municipalities be as
small as possible. Washington statute also requires the commission to “provide fair and
effective representation and to encourage electoral competition” (“All About
Redistricting -- Washington,” n.d.)

Figure 9: Washington Congressional Districts

Gerrymandering is a political strategy that should not only alarm Americans, but
also be an issue that drives them to the polls. Even a redistricting strategy that is partisan
blind is more democratic than allowing partisans to gerrymander the map. It can be said
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that redistricting processes that take pride in keeping politics out it all together as seen in
Iowa is the best way to go about redistricting. While this strategy is idealistic in terms of
the rest of the country, independent redistricting commissions such as the ones in Arizona
and Washington are the next best way to go about the redistricting process (Daley, 2017).
The maps drawn are at least bipartisan as hardcore partisans have argued against these
maps in federal court in states such as Arizona (Daley, 2017). The partisan gerrymander
is becoming so much of a problem that the courts have forced some states such as
Pennsylvania to redraw their map on account of partisan gerrymandering for the first
time. Gerrymandering is responsible for the erosion of democracy as the goal is to make
one party’s votes count more than that of their counterpart.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Discussion of Methods
This mixed methods study was done using an integration of correlational analysis
and investigation of specific case study states. Six states were chosen to examine: three
that are notoriously gerrymandered, and three that take steps to make sure they draw
maps without bias. The following steps were taken to analyze each case study state
(Figure 10): first, existing literature on each state’s redistricting policies, historically to
present, were examined and synthesized, second, GIS was used to measure compactness
of the districts within each of the states and then to display this information, third,
analysis of clustering patterns based on race and median household income was
completed, and, fourth, the efficiency gaps were gathered for each of the districts in the
case study states for a comparative analysis. The outcomes of this work speak to how
gerrymandering plays a significant role in the erosion of democracy here in the United

Compare & Analyze

States.

Qualitative Content
Analysis of Existing
Literature and Legislation
Measure Compactness of
Districts
Determine Efficiency Gap
of Each State
Examine Clustering Data
and Maps

Figure 10: Research Graphic Organizer
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In order to identify the most precise measure of gerrymandered congressional
districts, clustering analysis based on race and median household income demographics
as well as compactness measures of individual districts and efficiency gaps of entire
states were examined. Comparing these numbers to actions being taken in court are a
good measure to show which numbers do the best job of describing a partisan
gerrymander. Upon examining the case study literature, it became easier to understand
the impact gerrymandering has on individuals’ votes who live in these gerrymandered
districts and the political process as a whole. After examining case study literature,
measuring compactness of each individual district within these states, efficiency gaps of
entire states, and comparing the data collected for the six selected states, identifying ways
in which gerrymandered maps can be avoided and understanding the overall impact that
gerrymandering has on democracy became something that is able to be done in a
scientific manner.
Study Area
To reiterate, this study looks at federal congressional districts of six states in the
United States in order to see whether there is indeed a better way to do redistricting after
each decennial census. The six states to be examined in this study, as shown in Figure 3,
are Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Iowa, Arizona, and Washington.
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Wisconsin were chosen because they are states that
are notoriously gerrymandered. Each of these three states has either been forced by a
federal court to redraw their map to some extent or has a case pending with the United
States Supreme Court later in 2018. Iowa, Arizona, and Washington were chosen because
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they are states that take active measures in order to hopefully avoid partisan
gerrymandering.
Analysis Methods
For this study, as shown above in Figure 10, first, existing literature on each
state’s redistricting policies, historically to present, were examined and synthesized.
Next, GIS was used to measure compactness of the districts within each of the states and
then to display this information. Third, analysis of clustering patterns based on race and
median household income was completed. Fourth and finally, the efficiency gaps were
gathered for each of the districts in the case study states for a comparative analysis.
The existing literature on each state’s redistricting policies came from a vast array
of sources; everything from newspaper articles to actual laws and procedures that are in
place in different states. The literature examined for this study came from a search for
measures of gerrymandering and going through the tools included with the ArcGIS
software. Measuring gerrymandering by looking at compactness measures, efficiency gap
data, and by analyzing clustering patterns alongside the analysis of the existing literature
were chosen as analysis method because of the contrast between each of the methods.
The compactness of each district within each of the six states examined was
calculated using two different measures of compactness, Reock Scores and Convex Hull
Ratios. Reock Scores are calculated by the GIS software by dividing the actual area of the
district by the area of the smallest circle that can enclose the district. Convex Hull Ratios
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are calculated by the GIS software by dividing the area of the actual district by the area of
the smallest convex polygon that can enclose the entire district.
The grouping on the median household income maps was done according to tax
brackets while the percentages in the race maps are percentages of the census block
groups as a whole. Using the GIS software to run the Local Moran’s I test led to the
output tables included which were used to examine states individually as well as for
comparison. Upon running this test, it became clear to the naked eye that grouping is
happening based on both variables (median household income and race) and, in the states
that are notoriously gerrymandered, that the congressional districts drawn on the map are
related to this grouping phenomenon.
The efficiency gap data came from Princeton University’s “Princeton
Gerrymandering Project” and can be found at http://gerrymander.princeton.edu/
(“Princeton Gerrymandering Project,” n.d.). In order to make the maps in the appendices,
the decennial census data as well as the American Community Survey data, both found
on the census website (Geography, n.d.), were used for this study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The results of this research will be reported in the following format, with each
state following the same formatting. First, the existing literature examined as part of the
literature synthesis will be discussed in terms of what each state is experiencing in terms
of redistricting. Next, the spatial autocorrelation (global Moran’s I) data generated using
ArcGIS will be used to explain what kind of clustering is happening in each state based
on three variables (median household income, and race (non-white and white)). Finally,
Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores will be reported and used to discuss the
compactness of each district within the given state and how these numbers relate to the
other states included in this study.
North Carolina
North Carolina is a state that can be considered less democratic according to
several different measures. The first hint that this is the case came with the January 9,
2018 federal court ruling that North Carolina would have to redraw its 13 congressional
districts and then the August 27, 2018 ruling by a panel of three federal judges that held
the January 9, 2018 ruling due to the congressional districts being drawn in an
unconstitutional fashion as they favor Republicans over Democrats also forcing them to
redraw districts before the November 2018 midterm elections (Almasy, 2018; Barnes,
2018b). According to existing literature, voters in North Carolina have been nearly split
along partisan lines recently in elections (Almasy, 2018). With this being said however,
Republicans control ten U.S. House seats compared with only three for Democrats
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(Almasy, 2018). While North Carolina does have requirements in place to avoid
gerrymandering, politicians in the General Assembly have only their interpretation of the
requirements to regulate the maps they produce (Research Division N.C. General
Assembly, 2011).
Table 1: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Median Household Income
North Carolina: Global Moran’s I Summary (Median Household Income)
0.308436
Moran’s Index
-0.000163
Expected Index
0.000003
Variance
187.603018
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
The first measures that we will examine have to do with packing and clustering.
Packing has been measured based on three different variables; median household income,
and two different race variables, white and non-white. The two biggest takeaways from
Table 1 above include the Moran’s Index and Z-Score. Based on the standard
distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I) report as shown in
Figure 11, it can first be said that the clustering taking place based on median household
income has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random chance according to
the Z-Score. In other words, there is definitely clustering happening based on median
household income. The Moran’s Index being 0.308436 also tells us that there is
significant clustering based on median household income taking place. The Moran’s
Index will typically be a value that falls between -1 and 1. A value greater than zero tells
us that more clustering of the groups is taking place while a value less than zero tells us
there is more dispersion of the groups.
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Figure 11: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Median Household Income (A
Moran’s Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)

Table 2: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (Non-White)
North Carolina: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: Non-White)
0.344456
Moran’s Index
-0.000164
Expected Index
0.000003
Variance
208.922704
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 12, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (non-white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of
random chance according to the Z-Score value seen above in Table 2. Also shown above
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in Table 2 is the Moran’s Index of 0.344456, telling us again that clustering is indeed
happening based on race (non-white).

Figure 12: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (Non-White) (A Moran’s
Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 3: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (White)
North Carolina: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: White)
0.344456
Moran’s Index
-0.000164
Expected Index
0.000003
Variance
208.922704
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 13, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random
chance according to the Z-Score seen above in Table 3. Also shown above in Table 3 is
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the Moran’s Index of 0.344456, telling us again that clustering is indeed happening based
on race (white).

Figure 13: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (White) (A Moran’s Index
value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
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Table 4: Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
North Carolina
District Convex Hull Ratio Reock Score
0.685908
0.34477
1
0.715098
0.31626
2
0.559247
0.321763
3
0.599978
0.310936
4
0.772322
0.360643
5
0.764143
0.499161
6
0.760963
0.477022
7
0.672293
0.251167
8
0.639232
0.233544
9
0.704022
0.356448
10
0.815723
0.258459
11
0.740508
0.43555
12
0.649517
0.360026
13
0.698381
0.348134
Mean
Finally, as we see below in Figure 36, gerrymandered states such as North
Carolina tend to have less compact congressional districts than states that seek to avoid
gerrymandering. What we can take from this is that in these states, there is a conscious
effort to include and exclude certain voters from certain districts. Based on average
Reock Score of 0.348134 as shown above in Table 4, North Carolina has even less
compact districts than other states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen in Figure
14. Based on average Convex Hull Ratio of 0.698381 as shown above in Table 4, North
Carolina has more compact congressional districts than the average for states that are
notoriously gerrymandered, but still less compact congressional districts than states that
seek to avoid gerrymandering as seen below in Figure 14. It is also very interesting that,
based on these measures of compactness, there isn’t one congressional district within
North Carolina that both compactness measures agree is the least compact. District 3 is
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the least compact district based on Convex Hull Ratio while District 9 is the least
compact based on Reock Score as shown in Table 4. This is important because the
argument can be made that compactness is not a measure that can be trusted to quantify a
gerrymander being that two different measures of the compactness of a given district can
be telling the interpreter of that data two different messages; this stands true for all of the
case study states.
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Figure 14: A Comparison of Compactness: North Carolina (The Closer a Given Value is
to 1, the More Compact the District)
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania is a state that can be considered less democratic according to several
different measures. Signs that this is the case come from examining how the Republicans
had created districts where the Democrats win a small number of seats with a high
percentage of the vote, and Republicans win more seats with safe but not excessive
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margins (Daley, 2017). After the 2010 census when the Republican Party won the
majority of the state legislature including the governorship, they turned what was once a
long time blue state red. In 2012, Obama won 52% of the vote but Democratic House
candidates only won 28% of the seats (Daley, 2017). With this anti-democratic practice
happening in plain sight, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was brought the
gerrymandered congressional map and they decided that a new congressional map must
be made. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court released that map in February of 2018 (Cohn,
2018). This new Pennsylvania map released by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
compact, it minimizes county or municipal splits, and preserves communities of interest
(Cohn, 2018).
Table 5: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Median Household Income
Pennsylvania: Global Moran’s I Summary (Median Household Income)
0.264484
Moran’s Index
-0.000103
Expected Index
0.000001
Variance
270.005702
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Again, we look at packing and clustering based on three different variables;
median household income, and two different race variables, white and non-white. As
with North Carolina, the two biggest focal points from Table 5 above include the
Moran’s Index and Z-Score. Based on the standard distribution graph included in the
spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 15, it can first be said that
the clustering taking place based on median household income has less than a 1%
likelihood of being the result of random chance according to the Z-Score. In other words,
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there is definitely clustering happening based on median household income. The Moran’s
Index being 0.264484 also tells us that there is significant clustering based on median
household income taking place. The Moran’s Index will typically be a value that falls
between -1 and 1. A value greater than zero tells us that more clustering of the groups is
taking place while a value less than zero tells us there is more dispersion of the groups.

Figure 15: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Median Household Income (A
Moran’s Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 6: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (Non-White)
Pennsylvania: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: Non-White)
1.494072
Moran’s Index
-0.000103
Expected Index
0.000001
Variance
1521.577456
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
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Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 16, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (non-white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of
random chance according to the Z-Score value seen above in Table 6. Also shown above
in Table 6 is the Moran’s Index of 1.494072, telling us again that clustering is indeed
happening based on race (non-white).

Figure 16: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (Non-White) (A Moran’s
Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 7: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (White)
Pennsylvania: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: White)
1.442425
Moran’s Index
-0.000103
Expected Index
0.000001
Variance
1468.924928
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
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Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 17, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random
chance according to the Z-Score seen above in Table 7. Also shown above in Table 7 is
the Moran’s Index of 1.442425, telling us again that clustering is indeed happening based
on race (white).

Figure 17: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (White) (A Moran’s Index
value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
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Table 8: Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
Pennsylvania
District Convex Hull Ratio Reock Score
0.531544
0.149816
1
0.865916
0.533424
2
0.687536
0.352365
3
0.853705
0.43488
4
0.729835
0.444273
5
0.520541
0.302571
6
0.458794
0.336541
7
0.767395
0.420235
8
0.66164
0.36498
9
0.594171
0.326689
10
0.565588
0.196295
11
0.434985
0.231179
12
0.603775
0.342684
13
0.613699
0.342804
14
0.601964
0.192154
15
0.617206
0.364683
16
0.461965
0.243334
17
0.669098
0.363508
18
0.624409
0.330134
Mean
Finally, as we see below in Figure 36, gerrymandered states such as Pennsylvania
tend to have less compact congressional districts than states that seek to avoid
gerrymandering. What we can take from this is that in these states, there is a conscious
effort to include and exclude certain voters from certain districts. Based on average
Reock Score of 0.330134 as shown above in Table 8, Pennsylvania has even less compact
districts than other states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen in Figure 18. Based
on average Convex Hull Ratio of 0.624409 as shown above in Table 8, Pennsylvania also
has less compact congressional districts than the average for states that are notoriously
gerrymandered as seen below in Figure 18. Much like North Carolina, based on these

51
measures of compactness, there isn’t one congressional district within Pennsylvania that
both compactness measures agree is the least compact. District 12 is the least compact
district based on Convex Hull Ratio while District 1 is the least compact based on Reock
Score as shown in Table 8.
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Figure 18: A Comparison of Compactness: Pennsylvania (The Closer a Given Value is to
1, the More Compact the District)
Wisconsin
Wisconsin is a state that can be considered less democratic according to several
different measures. Signs that this is the case first include the way that Wisconsin’s
redistricting process is only governed by their courts and procedural precedents. There
are no statutory or constitutional guidelines in Wisconsin law for congressional
redistricting (Keane, 2016). Also, earlier in 2018, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a
decision by a Wisconsin State Court that decided to strike down the legislative map based
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on an unconstitutional, partisan gerrymander for the Wisconsin State Assembly that was
drawn by Republicans after they gained control of the state’s government for the first
time in more than 40 years back in 2010 (Liptak, 2017). The Supreme Court was not
persuaded however by the challenges that were presented in court because they decided
they had not been presented a way for the courts to determine when partisan efforts
violate the United States Constitution (Barnes, 2018a). Wisconsin is an excellent place to
look for an example of how gerrymandering destroys democracy.
Table 9: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Median Household Income
Wisconsin: Global Moran’s I Summary (Median Household Income)
0.271125
Moran’s Index
-0.000224
Expected Index
0.000004
Variance
142.252692
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Following the same format as the previous states, based on the standard
distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I) report as shown in
Figure 19 it can first be said that the clustering taking place based on median household
income has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random chance according to
the Z-Score. In other words, there is definitely clustering happening based on median
household income. The Moran’s Index being 0.271125, as shown in Table 9, also tells us
that there is significant clustering based on median household income taking place. The
Moran’s Index will typically be a value that falls between -1 and 1. A value greater than
zero tells us that more clustering of the groups is taking place while a value less than zero
tells us there is more dispersion of the groups.
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Figure 19: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Median Household Income (A
Moran’s Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 10: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (Non-White)
Wisconsin: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: Non-White)
1.694673
Moran’s Index
-0.000224
Expected Index
0.000004
Variance
887.291963
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 20, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (non-white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of
random chance according to the Z-Score value seen above in Table 10. Also shown
above in Table 10 is the Moran’s Index of 1.694673, telling us again that clustering is
indeed happening based on race (non-white).
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Figure 20: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (Non-White) (A Moran’s
Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 11: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (White)
Wisconsin: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: White)
1.694673
Moran’s Index
-0.000224
Expected Index
0.000004
Variance
887.291961
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 21, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random
chance according to the Z-Score seen above in Table 11. Also shown above in Table 11
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is the Moran’s Index of 1.694673, telling us again that clustering is indeed happening
based on race (white).

Figure 21: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (White) (A Moran’s Index
value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 12: Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
Wisconsin
District Convex Hull Ratio Reock Score
0.87927
0.491302
1
0.878438
0.536049
2
0.585988
0.330515
3
0.718881
0.300809
4
0.820941
0.527907
5
0.689742
0.392621
6
0.708284
0.532797
7
0.681684
0.432227
8
0.745403
0.443029
Mean
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Finally, as we see above in Figure 36, not all gerrymandered states such as
Wisconsin tend to have less compact congressional districts than states that seek to avoid
gerrymandering. Based on average Reock Score of 0.443029 as shown above in Table 12,
Wisconsin has more compact districts than other states that are notoriously
gerrymandered as seen in Figure 22. Based on average Convex Hull Ratio of 0.745403 as
shown above in Table 12, Wisconsin also has more compact congressional districts than
the average for states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen below in Figure 22.
Much like North Carolina and Pennsylvania, based on these measures of compactness,
there isn’t one congressional district within Wisconsin that both compactness measures
agree is the least compact. District 3 is the least compact district based on Convex Hull
Ratio while District 4 is the least compact based on Reock Score as shown in Table 12.
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Figure 22: A Comparison of Compactness: Wisconsin (The Closer a Given Value is to 1,
the More Compact the District)
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Arizona
It is without question that Arizona is a state that does its best to avoid
gerrymandering for political gain. The citizen panel that was established to redraw lines
after Proposition 106 passed with 56% of the vote back in 2000 aims to truly take
partisanship out of the process (Daley, 2017). The maps drawn by these produced by
these independent commissions since 2001 have proved successful as districts have
shifted in swing years. For instance, Republicans held a 5-1 advantage after 2000, which
grew to 6-2 after 2002 elections, and then evened to 4-4 amid Democratic nationwide
gains in 2006 (Daley, 2017). While partisans within Arizona’s state government may not
always be happy about the maps produced by these independent commissions, they have
always held up when taken to court (Daley, 2017).
Table 13: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Median Household Income
Arizona: Global Moran’s I Summary (Median Household Income)
0.116258
Moran’s Index
-0.000239
Expected Index
0.000001
Variance
141.912107
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 23, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on median household income has less than a 1% likelihood of being the
result of random chance according to the Z-Score. In other words, there is definitely
clustering happening based on median household income. The Moran’s Index being
0.116258, as seen in Table 13, also tells us that there is significant clustering based on
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median household income taking place. The Moran’s Index will typically be a value that
falls between -1 and 1. A value greater than zero tells us that more clustering of the
groups is taking place while a value less than zero tells us there is more dispersion of the
groups.

Figure 23: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Median Household Income (A
Moran’s Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 14: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (Non-White)
Arizona: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: Non-White)
0.162604
Moran’s Index
-0.000240
Expected Index
0.000001
Variance
198.219293
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 24, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (non-white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of
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random chance according to the Z-Score value seen above in Table 14. Also shown
above in Table 14 is the Moran’s Index of 0.162604, telling us again that clustering is
indeed happening based on race (non-white).

Figure 24: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (Non-White) (A Moran’s
Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 15: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (White)
Arizona: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: White)
0.162604
Moran’s Index
-0.000240
Expected Index
0.000001
Variance
198.219293
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 25, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random
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chance according to the Z-Score seen above in Table 15. Also shown above in Table 15
is the Moran’s Index of 0.162604, telling us again that clustering is indeed happening
based on race (white).

Figure 25: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (White) (A Moran’s Index
value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
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Table 16: Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
Arizona
District Convex Hull Ratio Reock Score
0.741468
0.477949
1
0.884601
0.517757
2
0.747669
0.275485
3
0.62291
0.389759
4
0.880906
0.546898
5
0.823491
0.673631
6
0.835722
0.549559
7
0.659491
0.357286
8
0.53809
0.324147
9
0.748261
0.456941
Mean
Finally, as we see below in Figure 36, states that seek to avoid gerrymandering
such as Arizona tend to have more compact congressional districts than states that are
notoriously gerrymandered. Based on average Reock Score of 0.456941 as shown above
in Table 16, Arizona has even more compact districts than other states that seek to avoid
gerrymandering as well as states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen in Figure 26.
Based on average Convex Hull Ratio of 0.748261 as shown above in Table 16, Arizona
has more compact congressional districts again than the average for both states that seek
to avoid gerrymandering as well as states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen
below in Figure 26. It is also very interesting that, based on these measures of
compactness, there isn’t one congressional district within Arizona that both compactness
measures agree is the least compact. District 9 is the least compact district based on
Convex Hull Ratio while District 3 is the least compact based on Reock Score as shown
in Table 16.

62

A Comparison of Compactness
Arizona
Arizona

States That Seek to Avoid Gerrymandering

Gerrymandered States

0

0.1

Average Reock Score

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Average Convex Hull Ratio

Figure 26: A Comparison of Compactness: Arizona (The Closer a Given Value is to 1,
the More Compact the District)
Iowa
Iowa is another example of a state that takes great pride in respecting the will of
their voters in terms of how they draw their congressional districts. The redistricting
process in Iowa is filled with trust as no one dares to even challenge the integrity of the
lines. Since the year 2000, Iowa has had more competitive congressional races than
Texas, California, and Florida combined, despite having a fraction of the number of seats
(Daley, 2017). In Iowa, there is only one district that has been automatic for either party
since 2000, the Republicans own the rural north western corner of the state, where
representative Steve King and the Tea Party have established a heartland base.
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Table 17: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Median Household Income
Iowa: Global Moran’s I Summary (Median Household Income)
0.293041
Moran’s Index
-0.000380
Expected Index
0.000028
Variance
55.616720
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 27, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on median household income has less than a 1% likelihood of being the
result of random chance according to the Z-Score. In other words, there is definitely
clustering happening based on median household income. The Moran’s Index being
0.293041, as shown above in Table 17, also tells us that there is significant clustering
based on median household income taking place. The Moran’s Index will typically be a
value that falls between -1 and 1. A value greater than zero tells us that more clustering of
the groups is taking place while a value less than zero tells us there is more dispersion of
the groups.
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Figure 27: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Median Household Income (A
Moran’s Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 18: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (Non-White)
Iowa: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: Non-White)
1.019826
Moran’s Index
-0.000381
Expected Index
0.000028
Variance
193.153791
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 28, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (non-white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of
random chance according to the Z-Score value seen above in Table 18. Also shown
above in Table 18 is the Moran’s Index of 1.019826, telling us again that clustering is
indeed happening based on race (non-white).
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Figure 28: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (Non-White) (A Moran’s
Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 19: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information –
Race (White)
Iowa: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: White)
1.019826
Moran’s Index
-0.000381
Expected Index
0.000028
Variance
193.153789
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 29, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on race (white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random
chance according to the Z-Score seen above in Table 19. Also shown above in Table 19
is the Moran’s Index of 1.019826, telling us again that clustering is indeed happening
based on race (white).
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Figure 29: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (White) (A Moran’s Index
value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 20: Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
Iowa
District Convex Hull Ratio Reock Score
0.673088
0.396807
1
0.734574
0.316157
2
0.83353
0.478767
3
0.879101
0.494205
4
0.780073
0.421484
Mean
Finally, as we see below in Figure 36, states that seek to avoid gerrymandering
such as Iowa tend to have more compact congressional districts than states that are
notoriously gerrymandered. Based on average Reock Score of 0.421484 as shown above
in Table 20, Iowa has even more compact districts than other states that seek to avoid
gerrymandering as well as states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen in Figure 30.
Based on average Convex Hull Ratio of 0.780073 as shown above in Table 20, Iowa has
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more compact congressional districts again than the average for both states that seek to
avoid gerrymandering as well as states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen below
in Figure 30. It is also very interesting that, based on these measures of compactness,
there isn’t one congressional district within Iowa that both compactness measures agree is
the least compact. District 1 is the least compact district based on Convex Hull Ratio
while District 2 is the least compact based on Reock Score as shown in Table 20.
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Figure 30: A Comparison of Compactness: Iowa (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
Washington
Similar to Arizona and Iowa, Washington is another state that goes above and
beyond to try and avoid partisan gerrymandering. Every ten years, after the census data is
received, an independent redistricting commission is put together specifically to draw the
new maps for the state of Washington and then disbanded upon the completion of the
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redistricting process. The Washington State constitution says that when redistricting,
districts should be contiguous, compact, and convenient, while following natural
geographic, artificial, or political subdivision boundaries. The commission is also not
allowed to purposely draw plans to favor or discriminate against any political party or
group. By statute, Washington further provides that districts should be drawn to preserve
areas recognized as communities of interest, and that the number of divided counties and
municipalities be as small as possible. Washington statute also requires the commission
to “provide fair and effective representation and to encourage electoral competition”
(“All About Redistricting -- Washington,” n.d.). The wording in the Washington State
constitution is the most sound in terms of wording in that it states clearly the importance
of encouraging electoral competition.
Table 21: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information Median Household Income
Washington: Global Moran’s I Summary (Median Household Income)
0.251059
Moran’s Index
-0.000210
Expected Index
0.000002
Variance
159.847780
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 31, it can first be said that the clustering taking
place based on median household income has less than a 1% likelihood of being the
result of random chance according to the Z-Score. In other words, there is definitely
clustering happening based on median household income. The Moran’s Index being
0.251059, as shown in Table 21, also tells us that there is significant clustering based on
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median household income taking place. The Moran’s Index will typically be a value that
falls between -1 and 1. A value greater than zero tells us that more clustering of the
groups is taking place while a value less than zero tells us there is more dispersion of the
groups.

Figure 31: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Median Household Income (A
Moran’s Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 22: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information Race (Non-White)
Washington: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: Non-White)
0.341754
Moran’s Index
-0.000210
Expected Index
0.000002
Variance
217.255573
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 32, it can first be said that the clustering taking
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place based on race (non-white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of
random chance according to the Z-Score value seen above in Table 22. Also shown
above in Table 22 is the Moran’s Index of 0.341754, telling us again that clustering is
indeed happening based on race (non-white).

Figure 32: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (Non-White) (A Moran’s
Index value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
Table 23: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) Report Summary & Dataset Information Race (White)
Washington: Global Moran’s I Summary (Race: White)
0.341754
Moran’s Index
-0.000210
Expected Index
0.000002
Variance
217.255573
Z-Score
0.000000
P-Value
Based on the standard distribution graph included in the spatial autocorrelation
(Moran’s I) report as shown in Figure 33, it can first be said that the clustering taking
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place based on race (white) has less than a 1% likelihood of being the result of random
chance according to the Z-Score seen above in Table 23. Also shown above in Table 23
is the Moran’s Index of 0.341754, telling us again that clustering is indeed happening
based on race (white).

Figure 33: Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) Report - Race (White) (A Moran’s Index
value greater than zero tells us that more clustering is taking place)
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Table 24: Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores (The Closer a Given Value is to 1, the
More Compact the District)
Washington
District Convex Hull Ratio Reock Score
0.731825
0.421379
1
0.475268
0.222794
2
0.706187
0.25992
3
0.657158
0.432399
4
0.843393
0.394254
5
0.790966
0.477971
6
0.542369
0.144778
7
0.662719
0.411933
8
0.649873
0.248232
9
0.718898
0.393382
10
0.677866
0.340704
Mean
Finally, as we see below in Figure 36, states that seek to avoid gerrymandering
tend to have more compact congressional districts than states that are notoriously
gerrymandered. However, when it comes to the average compactness of Washington
State’s congressional districts, they are less compact than districts in the gerrymandered
states selected by the researcher. Based on average Reock Score of 0.340704 as shown
above in Table 24, Washington has less compact districts than other states that seek to
avoid gerrymandering as well as states that are notoriously gerrymandered as seen in
Figure 34. Based on average Convex Hull Ratio of 0.677866 as shown above in Table 24,
Washington, again, has less compact congressional districts than the average for both
states that seek to avoid gerrymandering as well as states that are notoriously
gerrymandered as seen below in Figure 34. It is also very interesting that, based on these
measures of compactness, there isn’t one congressional district within Washington that
both compactness measures agree is the least compact. District 2 is the least compact
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district based on Convex Hull Ratio while District 7 is the least compact based on Reock
Score as shown in Table 24. As a reminder, for all case study states, this is important
because the argument can be made in court and to the public that compactness is not a
measure that can be trusted to quantify a gerrymander being that two different measures
of compactness in any given district can be telling the interpreter of that data two
different things.

A Comparison of Compactness
Washington
Washington

States That Seek to Avoid Gerrymandering

Gerrymandered States

0

0.1

Average Reock Score

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Average Convex Hull Ratio

Figure 34: A Comparison of Compactness: Washington (The Closer a Given Value is to
1, the More Compact the District)
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
It is without question that it may be concluded that there are states right here
within the United States of America that are less democratic. Based on all of the evidence
in this study, it can be said that there are similar, measureable patterns that can be
examined in each of the states that are notoriously gerrymandered. The conclusions
drawn in this chapter use and reference the data discussed in the previous chapter.
The Big Picture
This study sought to determine if the United States can be characterized as more
or less democratic depending on the geographic location of where one lives and it has
been confirmed through this work. The results of this study show conclusively that the
efficiency gaps of states that seek to avoid gerrymandering are substantially lower than
the states that are notoriously gerrymandered (as shown in Figure 11 and Table 1).
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Figure 35: 2016 Efficiency Gaps
Table 25: 2016 Efficiency Gap Data (http://gerrymander.princeton.edu/) (R =
Republican, D = Democrat)
Note: Iowa’s efficiency gap was not calculated as there are only four congressional
districts, which is statistically too few for the tests run in the Princeton study where this
efficiency gap data came from (http://gerrymander.princeton.edu/). The researcher was
unable to calculate the efficiency gaps personally due to a lack of access to each of the
six selected states voting data
State
2016 Efficiency Gap
19.7% R
North Carolina
13.4% R
Pennsylvania
24% R
Wisconsin
2.3% R
Arizona
-Iowa
3.8% D
Washington
The results of this study also shows on the macro scale that, on average, states that seek
to avoid gerrymandering have higher levels of compactness in terms of their Reock
Scores and Convex Hull Ratios as shown below in Figure 12. This is relevant because a
sound argument can be made that compactness of congressional districts is not a measure
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that can be trusted in and of itself as two different measures of compactness can be telling
the individual looking at that data two different things.

A Comparison of Compactness Measures
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Figure 36: A Comparison of Compactness Measures
Highlights from Each State
The first quantitative measures of gerrymandering that were considered in this
study were the two measures of compactness, Convex Hull Ratios and Reock Scores.
Upon examination of Convex Hull Ratio and Reock Score data, it can be said that the
gerrymandered states are less compact than the states that seek to avoid gerrymandering
based on averages of like states. However, with this being said, not each state
individually had an average Convex Hull Ratio and Reock Score higher than the
combined averages of gerrymandered states. Such is the case in Washington where,
according to the average Reock Score is less than the average of the combined score for
states that are notoriously gerrymandered in this study. On top of the issue that these
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measures of compactness are only useful if you look at all states combined, two different
districts within the same state can be the most or least compact based on the two different
measures as seen in North Carolina where district 3 is the least compact based on Convex
Hull Ratio data but district 9 is the least compact based on Reock Score data. Although
this is the case, it is impossible to say which measure of compactness is the most
accurate. While the data included in this study says that overall, states that seek to avoid
gerrymandering have more compact congressional districts, it cannot be based on
measures of compactness that one makes the decision of whether or not the United States
can be less democratic based on the geographic location of where one lives.
The next note that should be made in reference to considering if one geographic
location is less democratic than another is that a congressional map simply being taken to
court is no measure in and of itself of a gerrymander. As is the case in Arizona, even
states that hand over the redistricting to an independent redistricting commission, have
their maps taken to court. However, as is also the case in Arizona, simply having their
maps taken to court doesn’t mean that they’re inherently gerrymandered, it means
someone with power doesn’t agree with the outcomes that they are producing. If court is
going to be taken into consideration when exploring the possibility of a potential
gerrymander, the only aspect that should actually be considered is what the court decides.
While places like Arizona frequently have their maps challenged in court to no avail,
there are states such as Pennsylvania where their state Supreme Court redraws the entire
map before an upcoming election. If one is going to base whether or not a state is
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gerrymandered based on their maps being taken to court, it is crucial that they do more
digging than just seeing that on the surface, a state’s maps have been taken to court.
When it comes to data that can be trusted as reliable and potentially used in a
court of law, the first measure that will be discussed is efficiency gap. Although, the
efficiency gap could not be calculated for Iowa, it does not mean that the efficiency gap
is impossible to calculate for the state. As is the case for each of the five remaining states
though, those that seek to avoid gerrymandering have substantially lower efficiency gaps
than those that are gerrymandered. Being that efficiency gaps are calculated based on
voting data itself, there needs to be an agreed upon limit to what the efficiency gap in any
given district in the United States may be.
Another reliable source of information for whether a state is gerrymandered
comes from what is produced by running the Spatial Autocorrelation (Global Moran’s I)
and Cluster and Outlier Analysis (Anselin Local Moran’s I) using ArcGIS. Spatial
Autocorrelation uses the spatial data to say whether or not clustering exists based on a
given variable within a dataset. All six states included in this study demonstrated
clustering based on the variables of median household income, and race (non-white and
white). However, where this data is especially valuable is in the Cluster and Outlier
Analysis (Anselin Local Moran’s I). Upon studying these clustering maps, one can judge
a gerrymander on whether it seems as though the congressional lines are related to where
this clustering is taking place based on visually examining the map and seeing where
groups that are alike (based on a variable such as race or income) have been packed
together or cracked apart so as to dilute their vote. As seen in Appendix 1, district lines in

79
North Carolina for example are directly related to the clustering taking place. Also, as
seen in Appendix 5, states that seek to avoid gerrymandering such as Iowa have their
congressional lines drawn in a manner that is completely unrelated to the clustering data
as there isn’t any effort made to pack or crack any group of people based on the data
examined in this study.
Answering the Research Questions
1. How can the United States be characterized as less democratic depending on the
geographic location of where one lives?


What do gerrymandered districts look like on a map?


How can one measure how representative those elected are of their
electorate?

2. How can maps that are less gerrymandered, or not gerrymandered at all be
drawn?


What would manageable standards include, exclude, and take into
consideration for measuring whether a political gerrymander burdens the
representational rights of a party’s voters?

The United States can be characterized as more or less democratic depending on
the geographic location of where one lives. This characterization can be made after
determining how competitive elections are in their given district based on efficiency gap
data that can be calculated and examining a clustering map to determine whether groups
of people were strategically packed together. As far as what gerrymandered districts look
like on a map, they tend to be less compact when analyzed using a map and there is a
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definite relationship that exists between where lines are drawn and where different groups
of people live. Again, upon examining Appendix 1 and Appendix 5, there is a noticeable
pattern-based effort made in North Carolina to pack groups together of similar median
household income and/or race as opposed to the clustering maps produced for the state of
Iowa. When it comes to the most unbiased way to go about measuring how representative
those elected are of their electorate, I recommend taking the vote totals for the entire state
and comparing them to the amount of representatives each party sends to the House of
Representatives. What this means is that if a party receives ~50% of the vote statewide,
said party should win ~50% of the available seats. Drawing maps that are less
gerrymandered can be done by taking partisanship into consideration when drawing
them. The goal of redistricting every ten years needs to become competitive elections, not
partisan gain. Finally, Manageable standards to include for measuring a gerrymander are
a combination of examining vote totals state-wide vs. the amount of representatives sent
to the house, as well as examining the maps produced in relation to clustering maps that
can also easily be produced. A measure that should be depended on less in terms of
gerrymandering is any measure of compactness. Measures of compactness never agree on
which district is the most or least compact, instead they’re a measure that should just be
looked at only in comparison to other states that are thought to be more or less
gerrymandered.
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Responding to Gerrymandering
When it comes to discussing how to fix gerrymandering as opposed to how to
identify it, this is a much more complicated task. Outcomes of this research supports
goals in redistricting. First and foremost, the goal in redistricting needs to be that
congressional election outcomes mirror how the state votes overall in any given election.
Meaning that a party that wins around 50% of the total vote state-wide, should win
around 50% of the congressional seats. In order to achieve this goal that has been
established, that partisanship needs to be taken into consideration when doing the
redistricting process. By examining census data, community survey data, and voter
registration data, it is only then that districts are drawn. After these maps have been
drawn, efficiency gaps should be calculated for each district to insure that they are at or
below the decided efficiency gap value that has been established as the limit. If the
congressional map is going to be used to have an effect on democracy, it should be a
positive one.
Contributions to the Literature
This study confirms that the art of gerrymandering that has been taking place
since before the ratification of our constitution is, indeed, still taking place (Barasch,
2012). Just like when Elbridge Gerry did it, districts in gerrymandered states have
districts that pay little, if any attention to boundaries of local government (Trickey, 2017)
Vague wording in the United States Constitution is partially what is to blame for the
gerrymandering problem (U.S. Constitution, 1787). Other research that this study
confirms is that large efficiency gaps are indicative of non-competitive elections which
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contributes to the overall polarization in the United States (McCarty et al., 2009). The
most detrimental effect that gerrymandering has on the United States as a whole is the
intense polarization that we’re witnessing in contemporary politics (Daley, 2017). While
this study didn’t disprove that that people who are alike tend to live by each other and
this is why gerrymandering doesn’t cause polarization; what it did prove is that a
conscious effort is made to include all those who are alike (on the basis of race or
income) in the same district or crack them between a few districts in states that are
gerrymandered (McCarty et al., 2009). This study also confirms the fact that relative to
legislatures, Independent Redistricting Commissions tend to draw districts that are more
compact, show more respect for the boundaries of local governments, and also do a better
job of preserving the population cores of prior districts (Edwards et al., 2017). Where this
work separates itself from existing gerrymandering literature however, is the examination
of the impact that said gerrymandering has on democracy as a whole. It is without
question that gerrymandering is an antidemocratic practice and politicians should be
selling it to the American people that way. This work also seperates itself from the
existing literature in that it doesn’t give compactness the same level of importance that
existing literature does. Competitive elections should be the goal in redistricting, not
prioritizing compactness with tools such as computer algorithms (Ingraham, 2016).
Limitations to the Study
There are two dominant limitations to this study. Specific limitations to this study
first include the repercussions of not having access to voting data for each individual state
included in this study. These repercussions due to limited access of data led to the
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inability of the researcher to calculate efficiency gap data. The researcher’s having to rely
on others’ data for efficiency gap led to there being no efficiency gap data included in
this study for the entire state of Iowa.
The second limitation to this study has to do with which measures of a
gerrymander are more or less accurate than the other. Specifically, it is of utmost
importance that one thinks about the inconsistencies between different measures of
compactness, specifically Reock Scores and Convex Hull Ratios, in terms of
congressional districts. All existing data and information needs to be examined in order to
comment on whether or not a given state is gerrymandered. No one measure of a
gerrymander is sufficient on its own, a holistic case needs to be made.
Future Research
I would personally expand on this research by including all fifty states. It would
be very helpful to have the data that was collected for this study for all 50 states so that
we could see how and where generalizations hold up and where they do not, such as
districts, in general being more compact in states that seek to avoid gerrymandering than
they are in states that are notoriously gerrymandered. With the results of a 50 state study,
the public could then possibly be educated to the point where they want something done
about this process that sticks its finger in the eye of democracy.
Conclusion
Democracy and representation go hand in hand in the United States because of the
way that our political system is set up. In a country where nearly everyone agrees that
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democracy is what sets us apart from other places around the world, a practice that
inhibits said democracy should be done away with post haste. The United States House of
Representatives was set up by the founding fathers to be the branch of government most
responsive to the will of the people and gerrymandering undoubtedly inhibits their will
and adds to the political divide that is ever growing presently. Regardless of which party
is in control of the redistricting process after a census, a partisan gerrymander should be
the last thought to cross one’s mind. In a country that supposedly values democracy
above all else, democratic, competitive elections should be something that we take great
pride in because that is how one makes democracy happen in real time. After
gerrymandering has taken place and there aren’t competitive elections happening in a
district, an incumbent representative’s only fear is a primary challenger running farther to
their left or right depending on which party has gerrymandered the state. The reason that
this happens is because the districts are not competitive in terms of Democrats and
Republicans, they’re only competitive in terms of who is a more of a staunch Democrat
or Republican. Purity test politics will be the demise of the United States.
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